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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
This appeal, considered on an extremely expedited basis, 
arises out of a challenge to New Jersey's recently-adopted 
state legislative reapportionment plan. On April 11, 2001, 
the New Jersey Apportionment Commission, char ged under 
the state constitution with the task of apportioning voters 
among the legislative districts following each decennial 
census, adopted a districting plan supported by the 
Commission's five Democratic members as well as the 
Commission's neutral "eleventh member." The adoption of 
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this plan came just before the April 19, 2001filing deadline 
for candidates for the upcoming state legislative election. 
The primary election is (as of the time of this opinion) 
scheduled to occur on June 5, 2001, with the general 
election to follow in November. 
 
On April 12, 2001, the day after the Apportionment 
Commission's adoption of the districting plan, Plaintiffs 
(Appellants in the current appeal) filed a complaint in the 
District Court for the District of New Jersey, alleging that 
the Commission's plan violated S 2 of the V oting Rights Act 
of 1965 and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to 
the Constitution. We set forth the relevant text in the margin.1 
Named in the complaint as Plaintiffs ar e: (1) several 
African-American registered voters and r esidents of Essex 
County; (2) several Hispanic registered voters and residents 
of Essex or Hudson County; and (3) the Republican 
members of the New Jersey Senate and General Assembly. 
We have, and will hereinafter, r efer to these individuals 
collectively as "Plaintiffs." Named as Defendants are: (1) the 
Apportionment Commission; (2) the Commission's five 
Democratic members; (3) the Commission's "eleventh 
member," Professor Larry Bartels; (4) New Jersey's 
Secretary of State; and (5) New Jersey's Attor ney General. 
We will hereinafter refer to these parties collectively as 
"Defendants." 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 provides in pertinent part: 
 
       No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, 
       practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or 
       political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or 
       abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to 
vote 
       on account of race or color. . . . 
 
42 U.S.C. S 1973. 
 
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall "deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny 
to any person within its jurisdiction equal pr otection of the laws." U.S. 
Const. amend. XIV, S 1. The Fifteenth Amendment provides that "[t]he 
right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or 
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, 
or previous condition of servitude." U.S. Const. amend. XV, S 1. 
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The gravamen of Plaintiffs' complaint is one of vote 
dilution. More specifically, Plaintif fs contend that New 
Jersey's new apportionment scheme deprives African- 
American voters in Essex County of their ability to have the 
representatives of their choice elected to the New Jersey 
legislature. For support, Plaintiffs r ely primarily on the fact 
that, under New Jersey's old apportionment plan, thr ee 
districts located principally in Essex County had 
populations that were majority African-American, while 
under New Jersey's newly-adopted apportionment plan, the 
African-American population in two of these districts drops 
below fifty percent, and in the third, stands at 51.2% of the 
total population. Plaintiffs contend that this elimination 
and weakening of formerly majority-African-American state 
legislative districts was a deliberate act on the part of 
Defendants, intended to dilute (and having the ef fect of 
diluting) the vote of the African-American population in the 
Essex County region of New Jersey. 
 
Upon filing this complaint, Plaintiffs sought and received 
from the District Court a temporary restraining order 
preventing Defendants from putting the new apportionment 
plan into effect. Four days later, on April 16, 2001, the 
District Court conducted a hearing concerning Plaintiffs' 
application for further relief, in connection with which both 
sides presented declarations from experts concerning, inter 
alia, voting patterns in Essex County, New Jersey. 
Plaintiffs' submissions, based upon analysis of recent 
elections, and buttressed by a letter fr om Martin Luther 
King III, head of the Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference, maintained that the reapportionment plan 
would reverse significant electoral and political gains that 
African-American voters have secured and thr eatened to 
frustrate future opportunities for the vigor ous participation 
of African-American voices in the political marketplace. 
 
Defendants countered that the newly-adopted 
apportionment plan did not dilute African-American voting 
strength, but rather enhanced it. Accor ding to Defendants, 
because of the existence of significant racial cr oss-over 
voting between African-Americans, whites, and Hispanics in 
New Jersey generally and in Essex County specifically, an 
African-American group need not constitute a numerical 
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majority in any single legislative district in or der to possess 
the effective ability to elect preferr ed representatives. In a 
submission similarly based upon analysis of r ecent election 
trends, Defendants contended that the r etention of the 
three majority-African-American districts advocated by 
Plaintiffs actually impedes the ability of African-Americans 
to elect the representatives of their choice, as it "packs" 
unnecessarily large numbers of African-American voters in 
the same legislative district, preventing them from exerting 
electoral influence in other parts of the state. 
 
After hearing these presentations, the District Court 
issued a bench opinion denying Plaintiffs' application for 
relief. Plaintiffs timely appealed fr om that denial, and we 
agreed to hear that appeal on an extremely expedited basis. 
This appeal largely concerns the events that transpired at 
the April 16, 2001 hearing, and the precise nature of the 
District Court's disposition of Plaintiffs' application for relief 
on that date. 
 
Crucial to our resolution of this appeal is the existence of 
a special procedural mechanism for constitutional 
challenges to statewide legislative apportionment schemes. 
That mechanism, codified at 28 U.S.C. S 2284, requires 
that a district court of three judges, rather than a single 
judge, hear "action[s] . . . filed challenging the 
constitutionality of . . . the apportionment of any statewide 
legislative body." Although a single district judge has 
certain limited powers, including the power to issue 
temporary restraining orders, until the convening of a 
three-judge court, a single judge does not have the power to 
entertain applications for preliminary injunctive relief. See 
28 U.S.C. S 2284(b)(3). In this case, the District Court did 
not request the convening of a three-judge court, nor did it 
determine whether such a request was necessary in light of 
Plaintiffs' claims. Accordingly, we must decide whether the 
District Court's disposition of Plaintiffs' r elief application, 
given the requirements imposed by S 2284, was error. 
 
We conclude that it was, and remand to the District 
Court so that a three-judge court can be convened to hear 
the Plaintiffs' Voting Rights Act and constitutional claims. 
In addition, we decline to grant Plaintiffs' r equest that we 
provide for interim relief pending action in the lower courts 
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because of our belief that under the present circumstances, 
we should avoid undue disruption of New Jersey's 
impending legislative elections. Moreover , as we explain 
below, we have no jurisdiction to grant interim injunctive 
relief in this case. 
 
I. 
 
A. 
 
The New Jersey Legislature comprises a State Senate 
consisting of 40 members and a General Assembly 
consisting of 80 members. For the purpose of selecting 
these representatives, New Jersey is divided into 40 
legislative districts, with each district selecting one senator 
and two assembly members. The New Jersey Constitution 
provides that, following each federal decennial census, "the 
Senate districts and Assembly districts shall be established, 
and the senators and members of the General Assembly 
shall be apportioned among them." N.J. Const. art. IV, S 3, 
P 1. To discharge this task, the Constitution authorizes the 
creation of an Apportionment Commission to consist 
initially of "ten members, five to be appointed by the 
chairman of the State committee of each of the two political 
parties whose candidates for governor r eceive the largest 
number of votes at the most recent guber natorial election." 
Id. The Constitution further provides that the state 
committee chairs are to make such appointments on or 
before November 15 of the year in which the census is 
taken, and that the Secretary of State is to certify those 
appointments on or before December 1 of that same year. 
See id. 
 
Within one month of receipt by the Gover nor of New 
Jersey of the official decennial census of the United States, 
or on or before February 1 of the year following the year in 
which the census was taken, whichever is later , the 
Commission is required to certify to the Secretary of State 
the apportionment of voters among the districts. See id. 
Certification occurs by an affirmative vote of the "majority 
of the whole number of [the Commission's] members." Id. If 
the Commission fails to certify an apportionment on or 
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before the constitutionally-fixed deadline, or determines 
prior to that date that it will be unable to do so, the 
Constitution mandates that the Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey appoint "an eleventh member 
of the Commission." Id. P 2. W ithin one month after the 
appointment of this "eleventh member," the Commission, 
again by a majority vote, is required to certify the 
apportionment of the legislative districts to the Secretary of 
State. See id. 
 
B. 
 
The most recent United States decennial census was 
taken in the year 2000, and, pursuant to its constitutional 
directive, New Jersey followed the legislative district 
apportionment procedure delineated above. An 
Apportionment Commission was appointed and certified in 
November 2000, consisting of five members each fr om the 
state Democratic and Republican parties (quite obviously, 
these were "the two political parties whose candidates for 
governor receive[d] the lar gest number of votes at the most 
recent gubernatorial election." Id. P 1). This 10-member 
Commission was unable to agree on a district 
apportionment plan, necessitating the appointment of the 
"eleventh member" by the Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court of New Jersey. On March 27, 2001, the Chief Justice 
selected for that position Larry M. Bartels, a pr ofessor of 
politics and public affairs at Princeton University, a 
founding director of the Center for the Study of Democratic 
Politics at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and 
International Affairs, a past pr esident of the Methods 
Section of the American Political Science Association, and a 
former chair of the Board of Overseers of the National 
Election Studies. Professor Bartels has studied and written 
extensively on electoral politics and statistical models. 
 
Following preliminary discussions both with the 
Commission's Republican and Democratic delegations to 
review procedures and standar ds for the Commission's 
apportionment work, the Commission set about the 
apportionment task, convening the first meeting on April 2, 
2001. During the period between April 2, 2001 and April 
11, 2001, the Democratic and Republican contingents 
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submitted several proposed apportionment plans and 
districting maps to Professor Bartels, which he and his staff 
received and evaluated. According to Pr ofessor Bartels, 
each proposed plan was evaluated against a number of 
specified criteria, including: (1) minimizing population 
deviations between the districts, in order to secure 
compliance with the "one person, one vote" rule established 
under the federal Constitution; (2) ensuring the fair 
representation of minority voters, as r equired by the Voting 
Rights Act and the federal Constitution; (3) keeping each of 
the forty existing districts contiguous; (4) keeping each of 
the existing districts reasonably compact; (5) respecting 
municipal boundaries by not splitting towns smaller than 
Newark and Jersey City among different districts; (6) 
respecting voting-district boundaries; (7) avoiding any bias 
in favor of one or the other political party; (8) ensuring that 
some seats remained competitive; and (9) minimizing voter 
disruption. 
 
On April 11, 2001, the Commission adopted a modified 
version of an apportionment plan, labeled "NJ2001," earlier 
submitted by the Commission's Democratic membership. 
The final vote was 6-1, with all Democratic members and 
Professor Bartels, the "eleventh member ," voting in support 
of the "NJ2001" plan, and with four of thefive Republican 
members of the Commission abstaining. In adopting the 
"NJ2001" Plan, the Commission rejected a competing plan, 
labeled "GOP-H20," submitted by the Republican 
contingent the previous day, April 10, 2001. 
 
C. 
 
The instant litigation commenced almost simultaneously 
with the Commission's adoption of the "NJ2001" plan. On 
April 12, 2001, the day following this adoption, Plaintiffs 
filed a four-count verified complaint in the District Court. 
The First and Second Counts alleged violations ofS 2 of the 
Voting Rights Act, the Third Count claimed an infringement 
of Plaintiffs' due process and equal pr otection rights under 
the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Fourth Count asserted 
a violation of the Fifteenth Amendment. That same day, 
Plaintiffs requested and received fr om the District Court an 
Order to Show Cause with Temporary Restraints. The Order 
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to Show Cause "immediately and temporarily r estrained 
from employing, ratifying, or in any way putting into effect, 
directly or indirectly, the apportionment map purportedly 
approved by the New Jersey Apportionment Commission on 
April 11, 2001," and further commanded the parties to 
appear on April 16, 2001 for a hearing befor e the District 
Court as to "why an Order should not be entered against 
[the Defendants] restraining and enjoining the [D]efendants 
. . . from employing, ratifying or in any way putting into 
effect, directly or indirectly, the apportionment map, 
purportedly approved by the New Jersey Apportionment 
Commission on April 11, 2001." 
 
On April 16, 2001, the District Court conducted the 
hearing and, shortly after the hearing's conclusion, issued 
an order denying Plaintiffs' application. The events that 
transpired at this April 16th hearing, and the precise 
nature of the District Court's disposition of Plaintiffs' 
application are our central focus, as they go to the 
significant and dispositive jurisdictional issue raised by this 
appeal. Accordingly, we will reserve discussion of these 
matters for Section II below. 
 
Although the District Court denied Plaintiffs' application 
for relief, it concurrently issued an oral temporary stay, 
enjoining the printing of ballots for the upcoming election 
until noon on April 17, 2001. Plaintiffs immediately filed an 
emergency motion before us, requesting that we continue in 
effect the District Court's stay of the ballot printing and 
that we expand the stay to reimpose the general prohibition 
against the implementation of the newly-adopted 
reapportionment plan that the District Court had initially 
granted in its April 12, 2001 Order to Show Cause with 
Temporary Restraints. On April 17, 2001, Judge Leonard I. 
Garth heard Plaintiffs' emergency motion and, sitting as a 
single judge of the Court of Appeals pursuant to Federal 
Rule of Appellate Procedure 27(c), or dered that the stay 
entered by the District Court be continued until noon on 
April 24, 2001.2 That same day, Plaintiffs noticed their 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Judge Garth declined Plaintiffs' r equest to expand the stay to 
reimpose the general restraints on implementation that were a part of 
the District Court's original Order to Show Cause with Temporary 
Restraints. 
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timely appeal to this Court. In light of New Jersey's 
impending legislative elections--as noted above, the 
deadline for candidates to file in the 2001 Senate and 
Assembly races was set to expire on April 19, 2001, and the 
primary election is (at the time of this opinion) set for June 
5, 2001--we agreed to hear this appeal on an expedited 
basis. We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. S 1292(a). 
 
II. 
 
The matter of the District Court's jurisdiction, given the 
specialized procedural requirements imposed by 28 U.S.C. 
S 2284 for challenges made to state apportionment plans, 
forms the heart of the instant appeal. The central inquiry 
before us can be stated as follows: Given the constraints 
that S 2284 imposes on the actions of a single district judge 
in proceedings in which a three-judge court is required, did 
the District Court act outside of its authority when, in its 
April 16, 2001 order, it denied Plaintif fs' application for an 
order restraining the implementation of the newly-adopted 
apportionment plan?3 We further note that our own 
appellate jurisdiction over the merits of Plaintif fs' claims is 
a function of the district court's jurisdiction. See Idlewild 
Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U.S. 713, 715-16 
(1962) (per curiam) (explaining that a court of appeals may 
not review the merits of a case that should originally have 
been determined by a court of three judges, although it 
may review the district judge's decision not to request such 
a court). 
 
In general, 28 U.S.C. S 2284 authorizes the convening of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. We note here that all of the parties have had ample opportunity to 
brief and argue this jurisdictional issue. Judge Garth first recognized 
the 
existence of a potential 28 U.S.C. S 2284 jurisdictional defect at the 
time 
he heard Plaintiffs' emergency motion for a continuance and expansion 
of the District Court's stay. As a result, Judge Garth directed the 
parties 
to brief this jurisdictional issue as part of the instant appeal. 
Moreover, 
during the course of a case management confer ence held on April 19, 
2001 pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Pr ocedure 33, we requested 
that the parties file further supplemental letter briefing speaking in 
part 
to the S 2284 issue, and the parties complied. 
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a district court composed of three judges, specifies the 
situations in which such a court is requir ed, and outlines 
the procedure that such a court is to follow.4 The two 
provisions most pertinent to this appeal ar e contained in 
S 2284(a) and S 2284(b)(3). Section 2284(a) identifies those 
situations in which the convening of a three-judge court is 
compulsory: 
 
        A district court of three judges shall be convened 
       when . . . an action is filed challenging the 
       constitutionality of . . . the apportionment of any 
       statewide legislative body. 
 
28 U.S.C. S 2284(a) (emphasis added). Section 2284(b)(3) 
delineates the scope of a single district judge's authority to 
act (and thus his or her jurisdiction) in pr oceedings that 
require the establishment of a thr ee-judge district court: 
 
        A single judge may conduct all proceedings except the 
       trial, and enter all orders permitted by the rules of civil 
       procedure except as provided in this subsection. He 
       may grant a temporary restraining order  on a specific 
       finding, based on evidence submitted, that specified 
       irreparable damage will result if the or der is not 
       granted, which order, unless previously revoked by the 
       district judge, shall remain in force only until the 
       hearing and determination by the district court of three 
       judges of an application for a preliminary injunction. A 
       single judge shall not appoint a master, or order a 
       reference, or hear and determine any application for a 
       preliminary or permanent injunction or motion to vacate 
       such an injunction, or enter judgment on the merits. 
       Any action of a single judge may be reviewed by the full 
       court at any time before final judgment. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. We observe that there has been some doubt expressed as to whether 
the three-judge court must always be convened for subjects within the 
scope of S 2284(a), or whether such a court is necessary only when one 
of the parties has requested it. See, e.g. , 17 Charles Alan Wright, 
Arthur 
R. Miller, & Edward H. Cooper,Federal Practice and ProcedureS 4235 (2d 
ed. 1988). But see Armour v. Ohio, 925 F.2d 987 (6th Cir. 1991) (en 
banc) (holding that three-judge courts ar e mandatory for cases 
encompassed within S 2284(a)). We need not resolve the issue today, for 
Plaintiffs did request at the April 16, 2001 hearing that such a court be 
convened. 
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Id. S 2284(b)(3) (emphasis added). The provisions of 
S 2284(a) and S 2284(b)(3) are necessarily interdependent: 
The constraints imposed by S 2284(b)(3) on a single district 
judge's authority to act are not trigger ed unless the action 
is one that is required, under the ter ms of S 2284(a), to be 
heard by a district court of three judges. Grants or denials 
of injunctive relief by a three-judge court are directly 
appealed to the United States Supreme Court. See 28 
U.S.C. S 1253. 
 
Our analysis of the District Court's actions on April 16, 
2001 will thus proceed in two stages. First, we will 
ascertain the exact nature of the District Court's denial of 
Plaintiffs' application. If the District Court merely denied an 
application for a temporary restraining or der, we would 
clearly lack appellate jurisdiction over that denial.5 See, 
e.g., Robinson v. Lehman, 771 F.2d 772, 782 (3d Cir. 1985) 
("The denial of a temporary restraining or der is not 
generally appealable unless its denial decides the merits of 
the case or is equivalent to a dismissal of the claim."). If, 
however, the District Court's decision constituted a denial 
of a preliminary injunction, we would have to consider the 
propriety of such action under S 2284(b)(3), which 
proscribes a single district judge from"hear[ing] and 
determin[ing] any application for a pr eliminary . . . 
injunction" in matters in which the convening of a three- 
judge district court is required. Should we find that the 
District Court denied a preliminary injunction, it will then 
be necessary to proceed to the second stage of our analysis, 
i.e., whether Plaintiffs' suit repr esented "an action . . . 
challenging the constitutionality of . . . the apportionment 
of any statewide legislative body" within the meaning of 
S 2284(a). We turn now to thefirst stage of our analysis. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. As explained above, even in actions for which the convening of a 
three-judge district court is requir ed under 28 U.S.C. S 2284, a single 
district judge retains the authority to issue a temporary restraining 
order 
upon "a specific finding, based on evidence submitted, that specified 
irreparable damage will result if the or der is not granted." 28 U.S.C. 
S 2284(b)(3). This temporary order continues in effect "only until the 
hearing and determination by the district court of three judges of an 
application for a preliminary injunction." Id. 
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A. 
 
At the outset, it should be noted that the District Court's 
April 16, 2001 order and bench opinion accompanying that 
order are less than pellucid as to the exact nature of the 
Court's disposition. The text of the order itself merely 
recites that "plaintiff 's [sic] application is denied," without 
specifying whether this action is a denial of a temporary 
restraining order, or of a pr eliminary injunction. There is 
record evidence, specifically a portion of the April 16, 2001 
hearing before the District Court, which suggests that 
Plaintiffs' counsel understood that pr oceeding (at least at 
its outset) to be one concerning the extension of a 
temporary restraining order, rather than one related to 
preliminary injunctive relief.6  
 
Nonetheless, after reviewing the full text of the transcript, 
we are convinced that the District Court's decision 
constituted a denial of preliminary injunction relief. Most 
significantly, the District Court, in issuing its bench 
opinion, explicitly stated that "[t]his, of course, is an 
application for [a] preliminary injunction," and proceeded to 
summarize its analysis under each of the four well-known 
prongs of the test for preliminary injunctive relief. 
Accordingly, we are convinced that the District Court's April 
16, 2001 order amounted to a denial of a pr eliminary 
injunction. We now proceed to the second, and more 
involved, stage of our jurisdictional analysis. 
 
B. 
 
As noted above, the bar imposed by 28 U.S.C. 
S 2284(b)(3) on a single district judge's authority to hear 
and determine a preliminary injunction application is 
triggered only in proceedings in which the convening of a 
three-judge district court is requir ed. Phrased in statutory 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Plaintiffs' counsel characterized the r elief he was requesting from 
the 
District Court on April 16, 2001 in the following terms: "We believe that, 
at a minimum, the restraints that you enter ed on the 12th [i.e., April 
12th] should be continued to the maximum period permitted under the 
restraints, to 20 days. . . . I believe you ar e required, your Honor, to 
have 
final relief here to convene a thr ee-judge panel to have a court to try 
this 
case within those 20 days . . . ." 
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terms, the jurisdictional issue at this second stage of our 
analysis is whether the suit instituted by Plaintif fs in the 
District of New Jersey constitutes "an action . .. 
challenging the constitutionality of . . . the apportionment 
of any statewide legislative body" within the meaning of 
S 2284(a). 
 
1. 
 
Plaintiffs' verified complaint contests the New Jersey 
Apportionment Commission's adopted redistricting plan on 
both constitutional and statutory grounds. Counts One and 
Two allege vote dilution on the part of Defendants in 
violation of S 2 of the Voting Rights Act, while Counts Three 
and Four present Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment 
challenges to the apportionment plan. Moreover , in the 
April 16, 2001 hearing, Plaintiffs' counsel pr esented both 
the Voting Rights Act and the constitutional grounds for 
restraining implementation of the apportionment plan to 
the District Court. Had Plaintiffs' counsel only brought the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment claims befor e the 
District Court, and had the Court denied the pr eliminary 
injunction as to those claims, our jurisdictional answer 
would be simple and straightforward: Plaintif fs' action was 
clearly one challenging the constitutionality of New Jersey's 
statewide apportionment scheme under S 2284(a), and thus 
the District Court, acting as single district judge, was 
explicitly proscribed from hearing (let alone denying) the 
application for preliminary injunctive r elief under 
S 2284(b)(3). 
 
At the outset of its bench opinion on April 16, 2001, the 
District Court recognized that Plaintif fs had presented both 
statutory and constitutional challenges to the New Jersey 
Apportionment Commission's redistricting plan, observing 
that Plaintiffs' claims "arise under the Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution 
and the Voting Rights Act of 1965." In r endering its 
decision, however, the District Court stated that the 
"principal issue" before it was whether the apportionment 
plan "violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965" 
and then, taking up the first of the four well-established 
factors for assessing the propriety of pr eliminary injunctive 
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relief, announced that "there is no likelihood that plaintiffs 
will ultimately prevail on the merits." W e read the District 
Court as confining its ruling only to the V oting Rights Act 
claim, and remaining silent on the constitutional claims. 
 
Thus, from a procedural perspective, we ar e faced with a 
situation in which the District Court had befor e it both 
Voting Rights Act and constitutional challenges to a 
statewide apportionment scheme, and proceeded to the 
merits of only the statutory claim. Insofar as Plaintiffs did 
not waive their constitutional challenge during the District 
Court proceedings,7 we must determine whether the 
District Court had authority under 28 U.S.C. S 2284 to 
render such a disposition. For the reasons set forth below, 
we believe that the District Court acted outside of its 
authority in entertaining the preliminary injunction 
application, and thus its decision must be vacated. 
 
Our starting point is the statutory language.8 A 
straightforward reading of the pertinent language suggests 
that the entire case, and not just the constitutional claims, 
must be heard by a three-judge court. This is because the 
language of S 2284 itself is broadly applicable to "actions"-- 
not narrowly to "claims"--challenging the constitutionality 
of the apportionment of a statewide legislative body. Under 
this view, because the "action" in this case includes a 
challenge brought under S 2 of the V oting Rights Act, the 
S 2 challenge, as well as the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendment challenges, are subject to S 2284(a)'s 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. To be sure, the bulk of the discussion at the April 16, 2001 hearing 
related to the Voting Rights Act claim and, as noted, the District Court 
focused on that claim, but it is clear from the transcript and from the 
briefs submitted to the District Court that Plaintif fs' counsel was 
asserting the constitutional claims. 
 
8. Our resort to the case law has not pr oved fruitful. We have been able 
to locate only one case that squarely addr esses this precise issue: In 
Armour v. Ohio, 925 F.2d 987 (6th Cir. 1991) (en banc), the Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that a district judge, sitting alone, 
had 
no jurisdiction to rule on the merits of a S 2 Voting Rights Act challenge 
to a reapportionment scheme brought in conjunction with constitutional 
challenges. However, two members of the court wrote separately, 
concluding that the district court (and hence the appellate court) did 
have jurisdiction over the merits of the Voting Rights Act claim. 
 
                                16 
  
requirement that they be heard by a three-judge district 
court.9 
 
However, our analysis cannot be so simple, largely 
because of the precedent that was generated under older 
statutory versions of the three-judge court r equirements. 
Prior to 1976, the Three-Judge Court Act mandated that a 
three-judge court be convened to hear any action in which 
plaintiffs sought to enjoin the enforcement of a state statute 
on constitutional grounds. Because the scope of the Act 
was potentially quite broad, with resulting disruptions and 
inefficiencies in the administration of cases, the Supreme 
Court determined that the Act should be construed to 
require a three-judge court in as few situations as possible. 
See, e.g., Swift & Co., Inc. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 128- 
29 (1965); Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246, 250-51 
(1941). Consequently, decisions from both the Supreme 
Court and the courts of appeals leaned towar d the view 
that when a case was presented that included some issues 
requiring the convening of a three-judge district court and 
some issues that could be ruled upon by a single district 
judge, there existed no jurisdictional bar to a single judge 
disposing of the issues properly within his or her province. 
See, e.g., Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 403 (1970). 
Further, some courts appeared to suggest that even where 
a single district judge improperly consider ed issues that 
should have been referred to a thr ee-judge court, the courts 
of appeals would have jurisdiction to consider appeals 
based solely on the aspects of the judge's ruling that could 
have been legitimately decided by a single judge. See, e.g., 
Stone v. Philbrook, 528 F.2d 1084 (2d Cir. 1975). 
 
These rules reached their zenith with the Supr eme 
Court's decision in Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528 (1974). 
In that case, the plaintiffs challenged a state statute both 
on the ground that it conflicted with federal law, and on 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. It is beyond dispute that a three-judge court, once convened, would 
have jurisdiction over the Voting Rights Act claim. See, e.g., United 
States 
v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 371 U.S. 285, 287-88 (1963). Rather, the 
question we face is whether the single judge, sitting alone, had 
jurisdiction over this claim, given the constitutional claims that were 
also present. 
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constitutional grounds. Under the old thr ee-judge court 
requirements, the constitutional claims could only be heard 
by a three-judge court, but there was no such requirement 
for the statutory challenge. Thus, in the lower court 
proceedings in Hagans, a single district judge, without 
requesting a three-judge court, consider ed the statutory 
issues alone and held in the plaintiffs' favor . Then, because 
the case had been resolved on statutory gr ounds, the judge 
determined that the convening of a thr ee-judge court to 
entertain the constitutional challenge was not r equired. 
 
The case made its way to the Supreme Court, which 
upheld the district judge's choice to adjudicate the 
statutory claims before determining whether the convening 
of a three-judge court was necessary. The Court rested its 
holding on several policy considerations, chiefly concerns 
for judicial efficiency, and the fact that, had the three-judge 
court been convened at the outset, the statutory issues 
might still have been remanded for the single judge's 
resolution. See id. at 544-45. Thus, a straightforward 
application of Hagans might well lead us to conclude that 
the District Court had authority to act upon (and thus that 
we have appellate jurisdiction over the merits of) Plaintiffs' 
Voting Rights Act claim. We believe, however, that Hagans 
is not apposite to the precise situation befor e us. 
 
In 1976, Congress amended the Three-Judge Court Act 
in response to complaints that the system was 
cumbersome, labyrinthine, and unnecessary. The new 
statute, as described at the outset of this Section, only 
requires a three-judge district court for certain 
constitutionally-based apportionment challenges, and when 
another Act of Congress specifically r equires one. See 28 
U.S.C. S 2284(a). Thus, the 1976 amendments limited the 
scope of the Three-Judge Court Act considerably, making it 
questionable whether the policy considerations that drove 
the original, narrow construction are still applicable today. 
These revisions militate in favor of our br oader reading of 
S 2284(a)'s scope. 
 
One could respond to this analysis by ar guing that 
Congress deliberately intended to exclude  statutory-based 
apportionment challenges brought under S 2 of the Voting 
Rights Act from the three-judge court r equirement imposed 
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by 28 U.S.C. S 2284(a). In support of this ar gument, one 
could point to 42 U.S.C. S 1973c, which necessitates the 
convening of a three-judge court to hear claims brought 
under the preclearance requirements of S 5 of the Voting 
Rights Act. This might suggest that Congress made a 
deliberate choice to require a thr ee-judge court for only 
particular types of Voting Rights Act cases, exempting 
claims brought under S 2. If such wer e the case, then there 
would be no reason not simply to follow Hagans and allow 
a single judge to resolve the statutory questions first. 
 
However, although this argument is plausible, we believe 
it must ultimately fail. We do not believe that Congress 
made a deliberate choice to distinguish between 
constitutional apportionment challenges and apportionment 
challenges brought under S 2 of the V oting Rights Act. This 
is because, when the three-judge court statutes were 
revised in 1976 to require that this specialized tribunal 
hear challenges to the "constitutionality of . . . the 
apportionment of any statewide legislative body," S 2 of the 
Voting Rights Act was not available to litigants seeking to 
challenge apportionment. At that time, apportionment 
challenges were generally constitutional in nature. See 
Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 893-94 n.1 (1994) (Thomas, 
J., concurring in the judgment) (explaining the history of 
apportionment and vote dilution claims). Section 2 of the 
Voting Rights Act did not become widely used for 
apportionment challenges until the 1982 amendments to 
that provision, and the Supreme Court's subsequent 
decision in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986). In 
fact, as late as 1980, the Supreme Court had not even 
definitively determined whether S 2 of the Voting Rights Act 
created a private right of action for voters. See City of 
Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 60 (1980). When Congress, 
in 1976, revised 28 U.S.C. S 2284 to limit the three-judge 
court requirement to those actions in which "the 
constitutionality of . . . the apportionment of any statewide 
legislative body" was challenged, the established statutory 
basis for such apportionment challenges was S 5 of the 
Voting Rights Act, see Allen v. State Bd. Of Elections, 393 
U.S. 544, 569 (1969), whose own statutory pr ovisions 
required the convening of a three-judge court, see 42 
U.S.C. S 1973c. 
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Further, the legislative history of the 1976 revisions to 28 
U.S.C. S 2284 clearly demonstrates that Congr ess was 
concerned less with the source of the law on which an 
apportionment challenge was based than on the unique 
importance of apportionment cases generally. The Senate 
Report, for example, consistently states that "three-judge 
courts would be retained . . . in any case involving 
congressional reapportionment or the r eapportionment of 
any statewide legislative body," S. Rep. No. 94-204 (1976), 
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1988, 1988, and goes on to 
explain that "[t]he bill preserves thr ee-judge courts for 
cases involving . . . the reapportionment of a statewide 
legislative body because it is the judgment of the committee 
that these issues are of such importance that they ought to 
be heard by a three-judge court," id. at 1996; see also 
Allen, 393 U.S. at 582-83 n.1 (Harlan, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (concluding that, unlike in 
other cases involving the three-judge court r equirement, the 
three-judge requirement of S 5 of the Voting Rights Act 
should not be interpreted narrowly, because "generally a 
plaintiff attacking a state statute [underS 5] could also 
make at least a substantial constitutional claim"). 
 
Based upon this history, we conclude that because 
statutory Voting Rights Act challenges to statewide 
legislative apportionment are generally inextricably 
intertwined with constitutional challenges to such 
apportionment, those claims should be consider ed a single 
"action" within the meaning of S 2284(a). Thus, when a 
single district judge is presented with both types of claims, 
he or she may not resolve the Voting Rights Act issues in 
isolation while reserving the constitutional claims to a 
three-judge district court; rather, the single district judge 
should adhere to the limitations on his authority imposed 
by S 2284(b)(3). 
 
Finally, we note that practical and policy considerations 
support our construction of S 2284. Questions regarding 
the legitimacy of the state legislative apportionment (and 
particularly its review by the federal courts) are highly 
sensitive matters, and are regularly r ecognized as 
appropriate for resolution by a thr ee-judge district court. 
See, e.g., Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 14 (1975) 
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(referring to apportionment challenges as "r egular grist for 
the three-judge court"). As the Supr eme Court has 
explained, in such redistricting challenges, the potential for 
federal disruption of a state's internal political structure is 
great, counseling in favor of the establishment of a 
specialized adjudicatory machinery: "Congr ess has 
determined that three-judge courts ar e desirable in a 
number of circumstances involving confr ontations between 
state and federal power or in circumstances involving a 
potential for substantial interference with government 
administration." Allen, 393 U.S. at 563. Thus, challenges to 
apportionment are the kinds of claims r equiring what has 
been described as the "special and extraor dinary 
procedure" represented by the convening of a three-judge 
district court. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 
155 (1963). 
 
More significantly, it is clear that questions regarding the 
legitimacy of an apportionment scheme, whether under the 
Constitution or under the Voting Rights Act of 1965, are 
"intimately related," Armour v. Ohio, 925 F.2d 987, 988 (6th 
Cir. 1991) (en banc), and are intensely fact-bound, 
depending "entirely on the facts and cir cumstances of each 
case." Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 155 (1993). These 
observations inveigh against permitting a single district 
judge to reach the merits only as to statutory Voting Rights 
Act claims. Under a scheme in which a single district judge 
can legitimately adjudicate the merits of a V oting Rights Act 
challenge (while leaving resolution of the Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Amendment claims to a three-judge court), two 
tribunals would be considering closely similar , albeit not 
perfectly identical, challenges to the same state government 
action. Not only does this cleavage seem unnecessarily 
redundant, but it creates the danger that the single district 
judge's conclusions with regard to the statutory claims-- 
particularly his or her factual findings--might well have the 
effect of dictating the outcome of the constitutional claims, 
thereby thwarting the expressed congr essional policy of 
requiring a specialized three-judge court for the disposition 
of such singularly important matters.10  
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. We recognize that the Supr eme Court in Hagans was obviously not 
concerned that a single district judge's factual conclusions in resolving 
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For these reasons, we conclude that when plaintiffs 
mount challenges to statewide legislative apportionment 
schemes on both Voting Rights Act and constitutional 
grounds, both sets of claims must be hear d by a three- 
judge district court. A single district judge may act on these 
claims only to the extent permitted by the pr ocedure set 
forth in S 2284(b)(3). 
 
2. 
 
Our analysis cannot end here, however, as we still must 
consider the argument that the District Court effectively 
complied with the procedure set forth inS 2284(b)(3) in its 
April 16, 2001 disposition of Plaintiffs' pr eliminary 
injunction request. More specifically, our holding leaves 
open the possibility that a single district judge before whom 
both Voting Rights Act and constitutional challenges to a 
statewide apportionment scheme are raised could decline to 
convene a three-judge court and could r each the merits of 
the statutory claims if he or she were to conclude that the 
plaintiffs' constitutional challenge was legally frivolous and 
insubstantial. The authority for this proposition comes from 
the Supreme Court's decision in Goosby v. Osser, 409 U.S. 
512 (1973), in which the Court stated that the convening of 
a three-judge district court is not requir ed when the 
plaintiffs' "constitutional attack" on state government 
action is "insubstantial." Id. at 518; see also Bailey v. 
Patterson, 369 U.S. 31, 33 (1962) (per curiam) (concluding, 
under the older version of the Three-Judge Court Act, that 
a three-judge district court is requir ed "only when an 
injunction is sought `upon the ground of the 
unconstitutionality' " of a state gover nment act, and that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
a statutory claim might dictate the decision of the three-judge court on 
the constitutional claim; to the contrary, the Court recognized that the 
three-judge court, in considering the constitutional claim, might well 
prefer a single judge to make detailed factualfindings. See Hagans, 415 
U.S. at 544. Nor was the Hagans Court concer ned with the relationship, 
intimate or otherwise, between the statutory and constitutional claims. 
However, as explained above, we believe that the 1976 revisions evince 
Congress's particular sensitivity to apportionment challenges and lessen 
the need for a narrow construction of thr ee-judge court requirements, 
rendering Hagans inapplicable. 
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"[t]here is no such ground when the constitutional issue 
presented is essentially fictitious"). Thus, deeming the 
District Court's decision on April 16, 2001 to be in 
compliance with the procedure set forth in 28 U.S.C. 
S 2284(b) would require us to characterize the District 
Court's decision in the following terms: W e would have to 
conclude that, in its April 16, 2001 order and bench 
opinion, the District Court found Plaintiffs' constitutional 
claims to be frivolous, and then proceeded to consider the 
merits of only their Voting Rights Act claim. We cannot 
reach such a conclusion, for two reasons. 
 
First, having read the transcript of the District Court's 
proceedings on April 16, 2001, we believe that the Court 
never reached the requisite conclusion as to Plaintiffs' 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment claims. Quite clearly, 
the Court never explicitly held that the claims wer e 
frivolous or insubstantial. Moreover, to the extent that a 
single district judge can reach an implicit  conclusion that a 
claim is frivolous, we do not believe that the District Court 
reached such a conclusion in this case. Even were we to 
interpret the Court's statement in its bench opinion that 
"there is no likelihood that plaintif fs will ultimately prevail 
on the merits" as a comment on the constitutional, as well 
as the statutory, claims, it cannot properly be characterized 
as a ruling that Plaintiffs' constitutional claims are 
insubstantial, as it is well-established that a district court's 
conclusion that a party will lose (or is likely to lose) on the 
merits of a claim is not equivalent to a conclusion of 
frivolousness for the purposes of establishing jurisdiction. 
See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682-83 (1946). 
 
Second, we believe that Plaintiffs' Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Amendment challenges are not constitutionally 
frivolous or insubstantial, as assessed under the standard 
announced in such Supreme Court cases as Goosby and 
Bailey. Goosby and Bailey set an extremely high bar for 
frivolousness: To be deemed frivolous, a constitutional 
claim must be "essentially fictitious,""wholly 
insubstantial," and "legally speaking non-existent," Bailey, 
369 U.S. at 33. The Goosby decision elaborated on this 
rigorous standard: 
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       In the context of the effect of prior decisions upon the 
       substantiality of constitutional claims, . . . claims are 
       constitutionally insubstantial only if the prior decisions 
       inescapably render the claims frivolous; pr evious 
       decisions that merely render claims of doubtful or 
       questionable merit do not render them insubstantial 
       . . . . A claim is insubstantial only if its unsoundness 
       so clearly results from the previous decisions of this 
       court [i.e., the Supreme Court] as to for eclose the 
       subject and leave no room for the infer ence that the 
       questions sought to be raised can be the subject of 
       controversy. 
 
409 U.S. at 518 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
Plaintiffs' constitutional claims, on their face, cannot be 
deemed constitutionally frivolous or insubstantial. 11 Indeed, 
Defendants did not press this point at oral ar gument. 
 
An apportionment scheme will be subject to strict 
scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal 
Protection Clause if race is the "pr edominant factor" in the 
drawing of district lines. Bush v. Vera , 517 U.S. 952, 959 
(1996) (plurality opinion); see also Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 
630, 649 (1993) (explaining that legislative districting 
schemes can violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal 
Protection Clause if they "cannot be understood as 
anything other than an effort to separate voters . . . on the 
basis of race"). Such a redistricting scheme may also violate 
the Fifteenth Amendment, at least if done with the purpose 
of depriving a racial minority group of the right to vote. See, 
e.g., City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 62-63 (1980) 
(plurality opinion); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 346 
(1960) (holding that "when a legislature singles out a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. An argument might be advanced that this Court ought not to be 
making an insubstantiality determination, on the theory that only the 
District Judge may rule upon this matter in thefirst instance, subject to 
appellate review. See, e.g., Fort v. Daley, 431 F.2d 1128, 1131 (7th Cir. 
1970). We disagree. Given the exigencies under which this type of 
litigation is perforce conducted, and the extensive scope of the 
submissions and arguments before us, it would seem fatuous for us not 
to reach this issue, which is an essential ingr edient informing the 
District Court's decision as to whether to r equest a three-judge court -- 
a decision which is itself subject to our plenary r eview. 
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readily isolated segment of a racial minority for special 
discriminatory treatment," such as by r econfiguring city 
boundaries so as to deprive African-American r esidents of 
the right to vote in municipal elections, such action 
"violates the Fifteenth Amendment.").12 
 
Plaintiffs have alleged both Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendment violations in Counts Three and Four of the 
verified complaint they filed before the District Court. The 
legal theories and factual support underlying these 
constitutional claims are not yet fully developed, but this is 
understandable given the fact that Plaintiffs brought their 
complaint only one day after the Apportionment 
Commission adopted and certified the latest districting plan 
for the state of New Jersey. As Goosby and Bailey teach, 
our inquiry here is not whether Plaintif fs have a probability 
(or even a possibility) of prevailing on their constitutional 
arguments, but whether such claims are inherently 
implausible on their face, e.g., because they ar e clearly 
foreclosed by existing precedent. Examining Plaintiffs' 
constitutional claims, underdeveloped as they may be, we 
cannot say that they are legally implausible. 
 
Throughout the admittedly brief period of this litigation, 
Plaintiffs have pleaded in their papers and continue to 
contend that Defendants acted with a discriminatory 
purpose--particularly a discriminatory purpose tar geted at 
African-American voters in Essex County--in that 
Defendants sought to dilute the effective str ength of the 
African-American vote in that region. Plaintif fs principally 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. We are aware that the Supr eme Court has not expressly concluded 
that a claim of vote dilution is cognizable under the Fifteenth 
Amendment, see, e.g., Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 
334 n.3 (2000) ("[W]e have never held that vote dilution violates the 
Fifteenth Amendment."), and has never explicitly found a legislative 
redistricting plan to run afoul of the Fifteenth Amendment, see Voinovich 
v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 159 (1993) ("[W]e never have held any 
legislative 
apportionment inconsistent with the Fifteenth Amendment."). 
Nonetheless, Bossier Parish and V oinovich do not alter our frivolousness 
analysis in regard to Plaintiffs' Fifteenth Amendment claim. We simply 
cannot conclude that the Court's silence and r eservation of these issues 
clearly forecloses Plaintiffs' Fifteenth Amendment claim, so as to render 
it frivolous or insubstantial under Goosby's strict standard. 
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allege that this discriminatory and dilutive intent is obvious 
from the fact that, under the newly-adopted plan supported 
by Defendants, the percentage of the African-American 
population in two of the three existing majority-African- 
American legislative districts in Essex County (Districts 27 
and 29) would be reduced to below fifty per cent, while in 
the third (District 28), the African-American majority would 
be preserved by a mere 1.2%. 
 
Plaintiffs amplify their argument by contending that 
these three majority-African-American districts were 
created as part of the post-1990-decennial-census 
reapportionment with the goal of safeguar ding the strength 
of the African-American vote in Essex County, and that, in 
the intervening decade, no changes in conditions or 
circumstances occurred that justify the elimination of such 
districts. According to Plaintiffs, the inference that must 
therefore be drawn is that Defendants purposefully sought 
to reduce and dilute the strength of the African-American 
vote in the Essex County region. Further , Plaintiffs assert 
that, in at least one of these three districts (District 27), the 
reduction in African-American population was done with 
the deliberate intent of safeguarding the incumbent 
senator's seat by transforming his constituency from a 
majority-African-American to a majority-white one. 
 
If Plaintiffs' claims are factually corr ect, then such 
purposeful action on the part of Defendants may ar guably 
amount to a violation of either the Fourteenth or Fifteenth 
Amendments. As noted above, at this nascent stage of the 
litigation, the evidence supporting Plaintif fs' contentions as 
to the Defendants' motivation in favoring the newly-adopted 
apportionment plan is scant at best. But Goosby 's 
frivolousness standard is not a test of the sufficiency of 
Plaintiffs' evidence; rather, it is an inquiry into whether, on 
their face, Plaintiffs' constitutional claims are "essentially 
fictitious," "wholly insubstantial," and"legally speaking 
non-existent." We cannot say that they ar e.13 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. We emphasize, of course, that by r endering this opinion we intimate 
no view as to whether Plaintiffs' claims should ultimately prevail. 
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3. 
 
Thus, we conclude that the District Court committed 
error by failing to follow the procedur e specified in 28 
U.S.C. S 2284(b). When presented with an action involving 
both statutory Voting Rights Act and constitutional 
challenges to the apportionment of a statewide legislative 
body, a single district judge cannot reach the merits of the 
statutory claims unless he or she concludes that the 
constitutional claims are legally frivolous and insubstantial. 
The District Court made no such ruling in this case, and 
our own review leads us to conclude that Plaintiffs' 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment claims ar e not legally 
frivolous. Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court's 
April 16, 2001 order, with instructions to the District Court 
to initiate the procedure for convening a three-judge court 
to hear both the Voting Rights Act and the constitutional 
challenges brought by the Plaintiffs. 
 
III. 
 
Having reached (and explained) our conclusion as to the 
District Court's error, we are obliged to address one 
additional matter, i.e., the issue of further interim relief. On 
April 16, 2001, Plaintiffs requested and received orally from 
the District Court a temporary stay enjoining Defendants 
from printing ballots for the upcoming legislative elections. 
This stay was set to expire at noon on the following day, 
April 17, 2001. On April 17, 2001, Plaintiff r equested and 
received from our Court (acting thr ough Judge Garth, 
sitting as a single judge) an extension of the District Court's 
stay; this extended stay is scheduled to expir e at noon on 
April 24, 2001. Judge Garth declined Plaintif fs' request for 
an expansion of the stay that would generally enjoin 
Defendants from implementing the Apportionment 
Commission's redistricting plan. On this appeal, Plaintiffs 
ask that we grant them further and broader interim relief, 
in order to prevent (in some fashion) the implementation of 
the newly-adopted redistricting plan. W e decline to do so. 
 
First, we are unsure as to the exact natur e and scope of 
the relief that Plaintiffs request. In the conclusion of their 
Brief to this Court, Plaintiffs ask us to"impose interim 
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injunctive relief against defendants to enjoin and restrain 
implementation or reliance" on the newly-adopted 
legislative redistricting plan. To the extent that Plaintiffs are 
asking us to grant preliminary injunctive r elief, we are 
powerless to oblige. It is beyond cavil that the thr ee-judge 
district court, and not this Court, is the pr oper forum for 
seeking such an interim injunction. Neither ar e we faced 
with a request for an injunction pending appeal. With this 
opinion and the accompanying judgment, the (pr esent) 
appeal is over.14 Mor eover, given the nascent stage of these 
proceedings, and the heavy factual development that will 
likely need to occur prior to a final disposition of this 
matter, it would not, at all events, seem appropriate either 
to extend or expand the current stay, which Judge Garth 
had entered with the understanding that it would be 
temporary in nature. For all these reasons, we will simply 
allow that stay to expire at its scheduled time, at noon on 
April 24, 2001. 
 
In reaching these conclusions, we also note our own keen 
awareness of the significant disruption that action on our 
part (or on the part of any federal court issuing interim 
relief) will have on the upcoming New Jersey legislative 
elections. The original deadline for filing a State Senate or 
General Assembly candidacy, April 19, 2001, has alr eady 
passed. We are also fast approaching the date of this 
summer's upcoming legislative primary, scheduled (as of 
the time of this opinion) to occur on June 5, 2001, in 
conjunction with the gubernatorial primary and the 
primaries for certain local races.15 Any interim injunctive or 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. Further, we are aware that the issuance of a "temporary stay" for an 
indefinite period may well be the functional equivalent of a (forbidden) 
preliminary injunction. See Stratton v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co., 
282 U.S. 10, 17 (1930) (explaining that the exclusive powers of a three- 
judge court are ones of "substance and not .. . form," and that "[i]t 
matters not whether the injunction is called pr eliminary or 
interlocutory, 
or is styled a temporary restraining or der"). 
 
15. We have been informed by counsel that the New Jersey Legislature 
is considering a bill, introduced on April 20, 2001, that would postpone 
the date of the primary election by three weeks, to June 26, 2001, and 
make an identically lengthy postponement to the candidacy filing 
deadline, moving it to May 10, 2001. We ar e not aware of the current 
status of this bill. 
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restraining action on our part, particularly action that 
broadly proscribes the implementation of the redistricting 
plan adopted by the Apportionment Commission, would 
likely delay or suspend the legislative elections. Further, if 
the legislative elections were delayed in this fashion, the 
State of New Jersey, if it desired to also avoid postponing 
the concurrent gubernatorial and local elections, would be 
required to hold two separate primaries and general 
elections for its state offices, at great expense to the 
taxpayers. Defendants have forcefully spun out the 
implications of such disruption in their briefs. 16 Federal 
court intervention that would create such a disruption in 
the state electoral process is not to be taken lightly. This 
important equitable consideration, going to the heart of our 
notions of federalism, was expressed quite cogently by the 
Supreme Court in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964): 
 
       [U]nder certain circumstances, such as where an 
       impending election is imminent and a State's election 
       machinery is already in progress, equitable 
       considerations might justify a court in withholding the 
       granting of immediately effective relief in a legislative 
       apportionment case, even though the existing 
       apportionment scheme was found invalid. In awar ding 
       or withholding immediate relief, a court is entitled to 
       and should consider the proximity of a forthcoming 
       election and the mechanics and complexities of state 
       election laws, and should act and rely upon general 
       equitable principles. 
 
Id. at 585 (emphasis added). This war ning in Sims on the 
issue of relief was delivered after  the Supreme Court found, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. They stress the need for at least seven weeks between the filing 
deadline and the election to allow for preparation of ballots, and 
delivery 
of absentee and military ballots overseas. They further argue that 
delaying the primary election would, in turn, create other problems, 
including truncating the general election campaign, depriving candidates 
of sufficient time to gather support for their candidacies, and depriving 
voters of time to develop informed choices. Finally, they stress that, 
even 
assuming final adjudication on the merits in Plaintiffs' favor, there 
would 
be further delays while New Jersey was given its fair opportunity to 
correct apportionment errors befor e the imposition of a court-ordered 
remedial plan. 
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on the merits, that a state legislative apportionment plan 
violated the Constitution. If aggressive federal court 
intervention is not necessarily appropriate following an 
adjudication of unconstitutionality, then sur ely it cannot be 
any more appropriate at this early stage of the proceedings. 
See Chisom v. Roemer, 853 F.2d 1186, 1189 (5th Cir. 1988) 
(vacating a district court's preliminary injunction of a state 
election, on the rationale that "intervention by the federal 
courts in state elections has always been a serious 
business, not to be lightly engaged in" (inter nal quotations 
and citations omitted)). 
 
Moreover, in undertaking the equitable calculus 
suggested by Sims, we certainly must account for the scant 
factual record brought before the District Court and before 
us. For instance, Plaintiffs' principal legal challenge to New 
Jersey's apportionment plan thus far has been a vote 
dilution claim brought under S 2 of the V oting Rights Act. It 
is well-established that, to make out a claim that a 
legislative districting scheme has diluted a minority group's 
vote in contravention of S 2, a plaintif f must demonstrate, 
as a threshold matter, the existence of three factors first 
articulated in Thornburg v. Gingles , 478 U.S. 30 (1986): (1) 
that the minority group "is sufficiently large and 
geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single 
member district"; (2) that the minority gr oup is "politically 
cohesive," i.e., that it votes as a racial bloc; and (3) "that 
the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it 
. . . to defeat the minority's preferred candidate." Id. at 50- 
51; see also Jenkins v. Red Clay Consol. Sch. Dist., 4 F.3d 
1103, 1115 (3d Cir. 1993). It is also clear that a plaintiff 's 
showing of these three factors is necessarily fact-intensive, 
requiring a careful and searching examination of the 
specific circumstances of each case. See, e.g., Voinovich v. 
Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 154-55 (1993); Gr owe v. Emison, 507 
U.S. 25, 41 (1993); Gingles, 478 U.S. at 46 ("[T]he [S2] 
results test does not assume the existence of racial bloc 
voting; plaintiffs must prove it."). 
 
But it is not just Plaintiffs whose claims r equire factual 
development. Thus far, Defendants have principally argued 
that, although the newly-adopted apportionment scheme 
may reduce the African-American percentage in previously 
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majority-minority districts to below fifty per cent, that 
reduction does not dilute the African-American group's 
voting power in violation of S 2 of the V oting Rights Act 
because, at least in Essex County, there is significant 
cross-over voting between white, African-American, and 
Hispanic groups. We note here that the Supreme Court has 
expressly reserved a final decision as to several of the 
issues raised by Defendants' argument her e--i.e., (1) 
whether an "influence district" in which a minority group 
comprises less than half the population can nonetheless 
comport with S 2 requirements, given the existence of cross- 
over voting by the majority group, see, e.g., Voinovich, 507 
U.S. at 154 (recognizing the possibility of influence districts 
in which minority group members "could elect their 
candidate of choice . . . if they are numer ous enough and 
their candidate attracts sufficient cross-over votes from 
white voters" but noting that "[w]e have not yet decided 
whether influence-dilution claims such as appellees' are 
viable under S2" and resolving not  to "decide that question 
today"); and (2) whether the presence of two minority 
groups, e.g., African-Americans and Hispanics, can be 
aggregated for purposes of determining voting strength and 
effectiveness, if cross-over voting between the two groups 
can be demonstrated, see, e.g., Growe, 507 U.S. at 41 
(assuming, without deciding, "that it was per missible for 
the District Court to combine distinct ethnic and language 
minority groups for purposes of assessing compliance with 
S 2"). 
 
Whichever way these issues are ultimately r esolved as a 
legal matter, one thing is certain: Evidence establishing the 
factual existence of such voting behavior will be absolutely 
vital. See, e.g., id. ("[W]hen dilution of the power of . . . an 
agglomerated [i.e., multi-minority group] political bloc is the 
basis for an alleged violation, proof of minority political 
cohesion is all the more essential."). Such proof in 
apportionment challenges usually comes in the for m of 
expert testimony and empirical evidence analyzing the 
voting behavior of the majority and minority gr oups in the 
region at issue. We do not have such a r ecord before us. 
Both Plaintiffs and Defendants rely primarily on statements 
made by witnesses in certifications whose accuracy and 
credibility has not been tested through cr oss-examination. 
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Given the fact-sensitive nature of a challenge to a statewide 
legislative apportionment scheme, we believe that the most 
appropriate procedural course is a r emand to the District 
Court for a convening of a three-judge court that will 
oversee the factual development necessary for full and 
appropriate resolution of Plaintif fs' challenges. Moreover, 
given the paucity of the facts before us, we certainly believe 
that any further intervention on our part, in the form of 
interim relief, would be inappropriate at this juncture. 
 
In denying interim relief, we certainly ar e not foreclosing 
the Legislature by statute from postponing the time of the 
primary in order to permit the thr ee-judge court to be 
constituted and for it to consider an application by 
Plaintiffs for a preliminary injunction after development of 
an adequate record. In this regar d, we point out that if the 
Legislature postpones the primary, an action which already 
has been proposed, it might be possible to r econcile the 
obviously desirable end of having the legal issues Plaintiffs 
raise decided prior to the primary election with the 
important consideration that the state election pr ocess not 
be disrupted unduly. Of course, at least at this time, any 
decision to postpone elections should be made in the 
legislative rather than judicial arena. 
 
And in stating that we are declining at this stage to issue 
any further relief, we are not for eclosing (in fact, we could 
not foreclose) the possibility of the parties seeking some 
form of interim relief in the proceedings on remand below, 
assuming, of course, that the procedures set forth in 
S 2284(b) are followed. That is, Plaintif fs could, consistently 
with S 2284(b)(3), seek another temporary r estraining order 
from the District Court, and the District Court could grant 
that temporary order upon "a specificfinding, based on 
evidence submitted, that specified irreparable damages will 
result if the order is not granted." 28 U.S.C. S 2284(b)(3). 
Moreover, as noted above, once the thr ee-judge district 
court is convened, Plaintiffs could apply to that court for 
preliminary injunctive relief. 
 
IV. 
 
Given the potentially disruptive effects that our actions 
could have on New Jersey's electoral process, it is 
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incumbent upon us to articulate our disposition of this 
appeal with surgical accuracy. Our exact disposition is as 
follows: We will vacate the District Court's April 16, 2001 
order, and remand the case to the District Court, so that a 
district court of three judges, as specified in 28 U.S.C. 
S 2284, can be convened to hear both the V oting Rights Act 
and the constitutional challenges brought by Plaintiffs. 
With respect to interim relief, the temporary stay issued on 
April 17, 2001 will expire at its scheduled time, April 24, 
2001 at noon. We will grant no further interim relief in this 
matter. We note, however, that neither the District Court, 
acting as a single judge, nor the district court of three 
judges that will be convened, is foreclosed fr om acting (and 
issuing interim relief), provided that they comply with the 
limitations on their authority imposed by 28 U.S.C.S 2284. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
 
                                33 
